Case file · Monday 16 November 2026
OPTIMJACK: the Optimizely supply-chain attack, followed through the public record
For a day, the Optimizely snippets of about 180 organizations served a stranger’s code. Most of what follows sits in public records and had not been reported.
Zoom, CNN, Equifax and the BBC were among them. The added code loaded a script called track.js from a stranger’s server into every visitor’s browser. It swapped crypto addresses on the clipboard, and iPhones got an exploit loader. Report URI found it. We followed it further, through records anyone can read. They are the snippet files, the Internet Archive, certificate logs, domain registries and the blockchains. And we keep watching.
Everything the records show, in one list
01
The 16th, minute by minute
Snippets caught by the Internet Archive carrying the code light up at the time the file itself says it was built, and go dark when it was rebuilt. Every other snippet’s file says when it was rebuilt. Play the day, or drag the clock.
Every snippet, as a table
| Organization (Report URI’s list) | Sector | Code in (ET) | Rebuilt (ET) | Archive copies | Now |
|---|
The card skimmer, site by site
| Site | From | Rebuilt by | Hours, at least |
|---|
02
Follow the money
Each payment into the attacker’s wallets, then every transfer out, then where those addresses sent it. Most of the money came from wallets the size of an exchange’s: the shape of someone withdrawing to an address they pasted, which had been swapped.
A node’s area is its dollars, at the rates implied by Report URI’s own table. “Back to March” adds the TRON wallet’s earlier payments. An address that takes from many senders and passes every cent to one busy wallet behaves like a customer’s deposit address at an exchange. The exchange can see whose account that is; the blockchain cannot. No exchange is named until a public label or the exchange says so.
What reached the wallets
| Eastern | Chain | Paid from | Amount | About | Record |
|---|
Every transfer out of the attacker’s wallets
| ET | Chain | To | Amount | Receiving address | Record |
|---|
03
The infrastructure
The iPhone loader’s server and two fallbacks were registered in the same minute on 9 November. Half an hour later they shared one certificate, a week before the attack. Solid lines are records this project read; dashed lines are someone else’s claim.
Everything in the graph, as a list
Inside track.js
04
Who is behind it
No one has named a person, and nor do we. The records come first. After them, what others have published, credited to each.
In the records
Published by others
05
How they got in, and where else
06
The log, 9 to 17 November
Every record with its time and its source. Tap a mark in the strip to find its line.
| When | Source | Record |
|---|
07
If you visited one of these sites on the 16th
Report URI’s advice, in short (their words in full):
- Update an iPhone or iPad to iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later.
- Check any crypto payment you made that day: if the address you pasted is not the one you copied, it may have been swapped.
- Watch your card statements if you typed a card number into one of these sites.
The list of organizations is Report URI’s. This page checks only the snippets it could find on their home pages.
08
How this was read
This is not a page of Optimizely or of any organization named here, and it asks for nothing. It gives no cause beyond what Optimizely has said: how the code got into so many unrelated accounts is for Optimizely to explain. Attacker hosts are written broken, like 1688360[.]cc, so they cannot be followed.
Three things here come from Report URI: the list of organizations, the attacker’s steps and the dollar rates. The source is “World’s Largest Brands Infected With Malware Via Optimizely” by Scott Helme, Report URI, 16 November 2026. It is licensed CC BY-SA 4.0, and it is reworded and cut down here. Archived copies come from the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine. The moving diagrams use d3-force by Mike Bostock (ISC license).