OPTIMJACK

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Case file · Monday 16 November 2026

OPTIMJACK: the Optimizely supply-chain attack, followed through the public record

For a day, the Optimizely snippets of about 180 organizations served a stranger’s code. Most of what follows sits in public records and had not been reported.

Zoom, CNN, Equifax and the BBC were among them. The added code loaded a script called track.js from a stranger’s server into every visitor’s browser. It swapped crypto addresses on the clipboard, and iPhones got an exploit loader. Report URI found it. We followed it further, through records anyone can read. They are the snippet files, the Internet Archive, certificate logs, domain registries and the blockchains. And we keep watching.

    Everything the records show, in one list

      01

      The 16th, minute by minute

      Snippets caught by the Internet Archive carrying the code light up at the time the file itself says it was built, and go dark when it was rebuilt. Every other snippet’s file says when it was rebuilt. Play the day, or drag the clock.

      Every snippet, as a table
      Organization (Report URI’s list)SectorCode in (ET)Rebuilt (ET)Archive copiesNow

      The card skimmer, site by site

      SiteFromRebuilt byHours, at least

      02

      Follow the money

      Each payment into the attacker’s wallets, then every transfer out, then where those addresses sent it. Most of the money came from wallets the size of an exchange’s: the shape of someone withdrawing to an address they pasted, which had been swapped.

      A node’s area is its dollars, at the rates implied by Report URI’s own table. “Back to March” adds the TRON wallet’s earlier payments. An address that takes from many senders and passes every cent to one busy wallet behaves like a customer’s deposit address at an exchange. The exchange can see whose account that is; the blockchain cannot. No exchange is named until a public label or the exchange says so.

      What reached the wallets

      EasternChainPaid fromAmountAboutRecord

      Every transfer out of the attacker’s wallets
      ETChainToAmountReceiving addressRecord

      03

      The infrastructure

      The iPhone loader’s server and two fallbacks were registered in the same minute on 9 November. Half an hour later they shared one certificate, a week before the attack. Solid lines are records this project read; dashed lines are someone else’s claim.

      Everything in the graph, as a list

      Inside track.js

      04

      Who is behind it

      No one has named a person, and nor do we. The records come first. After them, what others have published, credited to each.

      In the records

        Published by others

          05

          How they got in, and where else

          06

          The log, 9 to 17 November

          Every record with its time and its source. Tap a mark in the strip to find its line.

          WhenSourceRecord

          07

          If you visited one of these sites on the 16th

          Report URI’s advice, in short (their words in full):

          The list of organizations is Report URI’s. This page checks only the snippets it could find on their home pages.

          08

          How this was read

          This is not a page of Optimizely or of any organization named here, and it asks for nothing. It gives no cause beyond what Optimizely has said: how the code got into so many unrelated accounts is for Optimizely to explain. Attacker hosts are written broken, like 1688360[.]cc, so they cannot be followed.

          Three things here come from Report URI: the list of organizations, the attacker’s steps and the dollar rates. The source is “World’s Largest Brands Infected With Malware Via Optimizely” by Scott Helme, Report URI, 16 November 2026. It is licensed CC BY-SA 4.0, and it is reworded and cut down here. Archived copies come from the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine. The moving diagrams use d3-force by Mike Bostock (ISC license).